Industrial Bond Financing and the Florida Public Purpose Doctrine by Tew, Tom
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 21 Number 1 Article 8 
10-1-1966 
Industrial Bond Financing and the Florida Public Purpose Doctrine 
Tom Tew 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Tom Tew, Industrial Bond Financing and the Florida Public Purpose Doctrine, 21 U. Miami L. Rev. 171 
(1966) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol21/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
INDUSTRIAL BOND FINANCING AND THE FLORIDA
PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE
ToM TEW*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 171
II. STATE V. TowN or NORTH MIAMI-AN UNFORTUNATE BEGINNING .............. 174
III. THE PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE ............................................ 176
A. Who Determines a Valid Public Purpose-The Court or The Legislature? .. 176
B. Projects in the Public Purpose ........................................ 176
C. The Incidental Test .................................................. 177
D. Private Enterprise and the Public Purpose Doctrine-Four Leading Cases .. 178
a. GATE CITY GARAGE INC. V. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE ...................... 178
b. PANAMA CITY V. STATE ............................................ 179
C. STATE V. DAYTONA BEACH RACING & RECREATIONAL FACILITIES DISTRICT .... 180
d. STATE V. INTER-AMERICAN CENTER AUTHORITY ........................... 180
E. Cotney- False H ope ................................................. 181
F. A Retreat from Cotney-The Gate City Garage and Panama City Test ... 182
G. The Favorite Sons ................................................... 185
a. AIR TRAVEL ....................................................... 185
b. RECREATION ...................................................... 186
C. TRADE FAIRS ...................................................... 187
IV. PROPOSED JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND/OR LEGISLATIVE ACTION ................ 188
V. THE TENNESSEE STORY .................................................... 191
VI. A CAVEAT .................. ' ............................................. 194
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 194
I. INTRODUCTION
Laudable as is the effort of the people to lift their locality to a more
prosperous condition by their own bootstraps, so to speak, we do not
think it can be done within the framework of our laws. Section 10,
Article 9, seems completely to bar the way .... We regret that we can-
not for reasons to constitutional restrictions approve what appears to
be an earnest effort to improve the lot of the citizens of Washington
County.'
The irony of the quoted matter forms the basis for this article, for
indeed the laudable efforts of many of Florida's county development com-
missions are presently barred by this antiquated, outmoded section of
the Florida Constitution:
The Credit of the state shall not be pledged or loaned to any
individual company, corporation or association; nor shall the
state, a joint owner or stockholder in any company, association
or corporation. The legislature shall not authorize any county,
city, borough, township or incorporated district to become a
stockholder in any company, association or corporation or to ob-
tain or appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any cor-
poration, association, institution or individual.2
* Member of the Florida Bar; Associate, Shutts & Bowen, Miami Florida; former
Editor-in-Chief of the University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor for Freshman
Research and Writing, University of Miami School of Law.
1. State v. Washington County Dev. Authority, 178 So.2d 573, 574 (Fla. 1965).
2. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 10.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The application of Article IX, section 10, has split the Florida Su-
preme Court more often than not. The difficulty does not lie with the
wording of section 10 itself, but rather with the application of its com-
panion, the "public purpose doctrine."
Section 10 of Article IX of the Florida Constitution was first adopted
in 1875 as an amendment to section 7 of Article XIII of the Constitution
of 1868. The case of Bailey v. City of Tampa,' suggests that the motive
behind its enactment was an attempt to restrict the history of state,
county and municipal financial activity prior to the enactment of section 10
whereby these government bodies loaned their credit to railroads, banks
and other commercial interests in the state.' Many of these private com-
mercial interests proved to be poorly organized and managed and the
ensuing flood of inevitable financial reverses fell upon the states, counties
or municipalities which had become involved. They in turn, laid the
burden on the taxpayers.
The memory of these events and the resultant philosophy of restrict-
ing the pledging of credit is still alive today, as was exemplified in the
1959 case of City of West Palm Beach v. State.5 The court stated:
The procedure whereby public funds are used to aid or promote
individuals or private authorizations in private enterprise is a
dangerous and undemocratic course and may not be followed ex-
cept where it is clear and unmistakable that such private enter-
prise is a necessary adjunct to some proper public function.6
The danger is not totally blinding however, and the Florida Supreme
Court realized soon after the adoption of section 10 that not every in-
volvement by government with a private enterprise was necessarily
detrimental. A new theory was sought whereby the courts could dis-
tinguish the less undesirable financial arrangements, permissible under
section 10, from those which could not be permissible. The search ended
with the employment of the "public purpose doctrine," theretofore con-
nected with the power of counties and municipalities to tax. The doctrine
is set forth in section 5 of Article IX of the Florida Constitution:
The legislature shall authorize the several counties and incor-
porated cities or towns in the state to assess and impose taxes
for county and municipal purposes and for no other purposes
and all property shall be taxed upon the principles established
for state taxation ....
The gauge of the validity of a county or a municipal tax was an
available parallel for gauging a public purpose and the court chose to
3. 92 Fla. 1030, 111 So. 119 (1926).
4. Id. at 120.
5. 113 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1959).
6. Id. at 377.
7. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
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expand this doctrine, originally set forth in the taxing section of the con-
stitution, to a solution of the funding problems arising under section 10
of Article IX. The Supreme Court of Florida began to read section 10
as if it read "the credit of the state shall not be pledged or loaned to
any individual, company, or corporation or association, for other than a
public purpose." To this day, this construction, revolving around the un-
written public purpose doctrine, governs the determination of constitu-
tional validity of every industrial bond issue in the State of Florida.
In addition to the use of the public purpose doctrine to determine
the validity of taxing under Article IX, section 5, and bonding under
Article IX, section 10, the doctrine must be read together with: Article
IX, section 1, excepting from just valuation for taxes properly exempted
by law for "municipal purposes;" Article IX, section 7: "No tax shall be
levied for the benefit of any chartered company of the state;"I and sec-
tions 1' and 1210 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitu-
tion which limit the power of eminent domain to those takings of private
property justifiable as being for public purposes when just compensation
is made." Yet, it is in connection with section 10 of Article IX that the
public purpose doctrine has received its greatest judicial interpretation,
an interpretation that may be applied in most situations to cases in the
other sections.
A hypothet will focus the scope of this article. The elected officials
of X County, Florida, have met with the executives of Y Aircraft Manu-
facturing Corporation. As an inducement for Y Company to locate its
new manufacturing plant in X County, the County has agreed to con-
struct a new manufacturing plant to be leased to the Y Aircraft Cor-
poration. The construction of this plant is to be financed by an industrial
development bond issue' 2 and the rental proceeds of the lease will be
pledged to meet the obligations under the bond as well as the interest
payments. Both parties to the agreement are pleased because of the
obvious benefits which will accrue to each. The new industrial payroll
will create a sounder economic community. The new employees of Y
Manufacturing Company will create new deposit savings in the com-
8. "Tax levies are legal only insofar as they are clearly authorized by law for proper
public purposes." City of Bradentown v. State, 88 Fla. 381, 102 So. 556 (1924).
9. "All men are equal before the law, and have certain inalienable rights, among which
are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, requiring possessing and protecting
property, and pursuing happiness and obtaining safety." FLA. CO NST., DFCL. OF RIGHTS, § 12.
10. "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken without just compensation." FLA. CONST., DECL.
OF RIGHTS, § 12.
11. Compare Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959) with
Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
12. The industrial development bond is a public security payable only from the pro-
ceeds of a particular self-liquidating project owned by the issuing governmental agency. 26
FLA. JUR. Public Securities § 68 (1959). For an excellent discussion of the industrial de-
velopment bond see Industrial Development Bonds: Judicial Construction, U.S. Plant Con-
struction, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 262, 269 (1962).
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munity and will add generally to the community's economic consumption.
These employees will need new homes, new automobiles, and thus, in
turn their presence will create new jobs necessary to serve other in-
creased economic demands. In short, the effect of Y Company's presence
in X community will be multiplied far beyond the actual payroll of
Y Company. The Y Company will also benefit since it has been able
to establish a new manufacturing plant and facilities without a large
capital outlay. Particularly important is the tax benefit that will accrue
to Y Company. Under the present revenue rulings, Y Company can de-
duct the rents paid to the county as ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses under the Internal Revenue Code. 8 This obvious, mutually ad-
vantageous relationship would be judicially welcomed in our southern
sister states of Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee, Alabama and Arkansas;
but it cannot be implemented in the State of Florida. Why? Our supreme
court would invalidate the bond issue that would underwrite the plant
construction as a violation of section 10, Article IX, of the present Florida
Constitution and the public purpose doctrine.
It is the purpose of this article to review section 10 of Article IX and
its companion, the public purpose doctrine, in order to point out their
retarding effect on the Florida economy in the context of the current
intense economic competition for new industry in the South. The need
for a re-evaluation of the purpose of the doctrine is made particularly
acute by the well documented prediction that by 1970, Florida will have
an estimated eight million people and will rate eighth in size in the
United States, surpassing Massachusetts and New Jersey in population. 4
It is no longer feasible to support such a large population on tourism
alone; all informed voices agree-the need is for industrialization.
Florida's manufacturing employment presently represents only fifteen
percent of its total employment, a figure which compares poorly with the
national average of thirty percent.' It appears obvious that the new
jobs that must be found can best be supplied by increased industrializa-
tion of Florida. It is hoped that the courts, as well as the 1967 Legisla-
ture (impressed as they are with their self-assigned task of evaluating
Florida's antiquated Constitution) will study the picture developed by
this article.
II. STATE V. TOWN OF NORTH MIAMI-AN UNFORTUNATE BEGINNING
The pattern for the judicial construction of section 10 was firmly
established for better or for worse in the leading case of State v. Town
of North Miami.'6 In this case, the town attempted to issue certificates
which were to be used to purchase land, thereon to erect an aluminum
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103(a) (1).
14. FIRST RESEARCH CORPORATION, Florida's Future, p. 7.
15. Id. at 9.
16. 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
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plant which was to be leased to an aluminum corporation for twenty
years. The rent was calculated to fully amortize the principle and interest
on the certificates and to produce some additional revenues. In validat-
ing the certificates, the circuit court declared that the credit of the
town of North Miami had not been pledged within the literal meaning
of section 10. The supreme court rejected this argument and concluded
that if the execution of the proposed plan would serve a municipal pur-
pose, then the town would have the authority to issue the certificates of
indebtedness to accomplish that purpose; however, if the erection of the
plant was not deemed a municipal purpose, then the certificates would
be invalid. The court sidestepped the obvious plea that the aluminum
plant would be of economic benefit to the community by stating:
Every new business, manufacturing plant, or industrial plant
which may be established in a municipality will be of some bene-
fit to the municipality. A new supermarket, a new department
store, a new meat market, a steel mill, a crate manufacturing
plant, a pulp mill, or establishments which could be named
without end may be of material benefit to the growth, progress,
development and prosperity of a municipality. But these con-
siderations do not make the acquisition of land and the erection
of buildings, for such purposes, a municipal purpose.' 7
Thus, the argument of the circuit court, based squarely upon the
literal translation of section 10, was met and defeated by a resort to the
public purpose doctrine. From that starting point, it was judicially
established that the validity of any bond issue would thereafter be de-
termined upon the battleground of public purpose, and as developed,
whether any private benefit realized was merely incidental to this public
purpose. While only conjecture, it should be mentioned that the court,
before entering into a discussion of the law in relation to these questions,
pointed out and rightly so, that the lease arrangement was particularly
favorable to the corporation and that it contained a clause that allowed
the corporation to obtain fee simple title to the property by the pay-
ment of 1,000 dollars at the end of the lease period. Thus, under this
clause of the agreement, the town would have been obliged to sell to a
private corporation for only 1,000 dollars property that had cost 400,000
dollars. It is interesting to speculate as to what the attitude of the su-
preme court might have been towards the industrial bond issue had the
agreement been more equitable to the town, rather than so one-sided in
favor of the corporation. Such a windfall to the corporation may well
have triggered a memory of the earlier motivations for the enactment of
section 10.
17. Id. at 784-785. The court buttressed its argument with the following quote:
If the purpose is purely a private one, there is no power to issue [bonds] without
regard to the existence of any statutory or charter provisions, since even the legis-
lature cannot authorize the issuance of bonds for a purely private purpose.
4 MCQUIILAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 2436, pp. 147, 148 (2d ed. 1947).
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III. THE PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE
A. Who Determines a Valid Public Purpose?
Before a particular transaction can be deemed to be for a public
purpose, it is necessary to first establish who will determine this ques-
tion: the legislature or the courts? It is generally agreed that the ques-
tion is one for the legislature.'" However, courts have reserved various
degrees of permissible judicial review of this legislative determination.
In Florida, the legislative determination that a particular project may
be for a public purpose is not conclusive upon the courts, but such
declaration is very persuasive when taken in connection with the purpose
sought to be accomplished.' When the legislature determines that a
public purpose would be served, the courts will supposedly not find to
the contrary unless the legislature has acted unjustly, unreasonably, or
was arbitrary.20 The court will take judicial notice of facts and condi-
tions shown by the pleadings as well as those facts contained in the
record which support or defeat the requirement that the primary purpose
and aim of the proposed project is that of a public and a municipal
purpose.2'
B. Projects in the Public Purpose
The most baffling question concerning the validity of bond issues
under section 10 is the determination of the scope of activities which
will qualify as a "public purpose." Generalizations are easily made. Many
situations are readily recognized as being for a public purpose, while
other more complex state-private financial arrangements must be analyzed
by weighing the relative public and private purposes achieved.
Generally, a public purpose has for its objective the promotion of
the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity
and contentment of all the inhabitants and residents within the govern-
mental body.22 The Florida courts have accepted this general rule for
determining a public purpose.23 However, like most general principles,
the precise meaning of the terms can only be understood from their
18. 37 Am. JUR. Municipal Corporations, § 120 (1941). "The fountainhead and source of
all municipal power or authority is the Legislature." Gate City Garage v. City of Jackson-
ville, 66 So.2d 653, 655 (Fla. 1953).
19. There are certain limits beyond which the Legislature cannot go. It cannot au-
thorize a municipality to spend public money or lend or donate, directly or in-
directly, public property for a purpose which is not public. A legislative determina-
tion may be persuasive, but it is not conclusive.
State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
20. State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So.2d 34 (Fla.
1956) ; State v. City of Jacksonville, 53 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1951) ; State v. Monroe County, 148
Fla. 111, 3 So.2d 754 (1941).
21. Gate City Garage v. City of Jacksonville, supra note 18, at 656.
22. 37 AM. JUR. Municipal Corporations, § 120 (1941).
23. State v. Washington County Dev. Authority, supra note 1; City of Clearwater v.
Caldwell, 75 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1954); Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla.
311, 31 So.2d 483 (1947).
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previous judicial application to specific factual situations. Adding to
the lack of clarity, the Florida Supreme Court has declared that the
"question of what constitutes a municipal purpose is not static. 24
As discussed, many cases lend themselves to a ready solution when
the general public purpose test is applied. The Florida Supreme Court
has recognized that recreational facilities,"0 off-street parking, 26 bridges,27
roads,28 hospitals, 2 armories, ° streets and sidewalks,"' planetariums,
82
and school dormitories88 are within the public purpose doctrine. These
traditional municipal areas of activity offer no problem to construction
of section 10.
C. The Incidental Test
With the advent of broader economic improvement programs insti-
tuted by many counties, the courts were forced to adopt a new test in
determining whether the project was within the permissible limits of the
public purpose doctrine. This test became known as the "incidental test."
This change was necessitated by the fact that many "public" projects
involved, necessarily, some sideline financial ties with private industry.
The extent of private industry's involvement in the program would,
therefore, only invalidate the program if the private interest was deter-
mined to be more than "merely incidental" to the major purpose. If the
primary objective of the project remained public, merely incidental bene-
fits to private industry would not invalidate a bond issue underwriting
the project. The opinion in State v. Board of Control34 clearly expresses
the courts' attitude.
It is impossible to conceive of a public improvement which will
not incidentally benefit some private individual, association or
24. City of Fernandia v. State, 143 Fla. 802, 197 So. 454 (1940).
25. State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So.2d 34 (Fla.
1956) (auto race track) ; State v. Escambia County, 52 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1951) (development
of public beaches); State v. City of Daytona Beach, 160 Fla. 13, 33 So.2d 218 (1948) (con-
struction of stadium, boat basin, and recreational center).
26. Gate City Garage Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1953); Chase v.
City of Sanford, 54 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1951); State v. City of Miami Beach, 47 So.2d 865
(Fla. 1950).
27. Masters v. DuVal County, 114 Fla. 205, 154 So. 172 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
559; Stockton v. Powell, 29 Fla. 1, 10 So. 688 (1892) ; Skinner v. Henderson, 26 Fla. 121, 7
So. 464 (1890).
28. Hillsborough Co. v. Keefe, 82 F.2d 127 (1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 679; State v.
Brevard County, 99 Fla. 226, 126 So. 353 (1930).
29. State v. Walton County, 97 Fla. 59, 119 So. 865 (1929); McRae v. McSwain, 95
Fla. 893, 116 So. 862 (1928).
30. State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 47 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1950); State v.
Dickenson, 44 Fla. 623, 33 So. 514 (1902).
31. State v. City of Pensacola, 40 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1949).
32. Burton v. Dade County, 166 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1964).
33. State v. Board of Control, 66 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1953). The court held that as the
University of Florida is a public institution and is for public purposes, a bond issue to
construct student dorms was not in violation of Art. IX, § 10, of the Florida Constitution.
34. 66 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1953).
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corporation engaged in private enterprise for private gain. The
location and construction of courthouses, schools, roads, bridges,
colleges and the buildings essential to their operation, are pre-
dominantly and primarily for a public purpose and, yet, each
of them may be of some benefit to a private individual, associa-
tion or corporation, engaged in private business for private gain.
The mere fact that someone engaged in private business for
private gain will be benefited by the very public improvement
undertaken by the government or a governmental agency,
should not and does not deprive such improvement of its public
character or detract from the fact that it primarily serves a
public purpose. And incidental use or benefit which may be of
some private benefit is not the proper test in determining
whether or not the project is for a public purpose. 5
D. Private Enterprise and the Public Purpose Doctrine-
Four Leading Cases
The permissible amount of private enterprise involvement in a
project is difficult to ascertain by a review of the Florida Supreme Court's
opinions. In each of the following four cases the proposed bonding plan
was approved as a valid public purpose even though private enterprise
was incidentally involved. These cases are discussed in detail in order to
later point out the court's logical inconsistencies in their application of
the public purpose doctrine.
a. GATE CITY GARAGE, INC. V. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE
In Gate City Garage, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville," the supreme
court reviewed an appeal from a final decree validating an issuance of
municipal parking revenue bonds. The appellants argued that the reserva-
tion, in the cities, of authority to lease a filling station on the affected
property contravened the constitutional prohibitions against the utiliza-
tion of public authority to take one man's property for another's private
gain. Herein the door to a discussion of the public purpose was opened
by both the eminent domain provisions of the constitution, section 12
of the Declaration of Rights, as well as section 10 of Article IX. The
court held that the construction and leasing of a filling station on a
parking lot of the size contemplated were merely incidental private
purposes; the primary purpose was to construct a parking lot to serve a
public. The court took judicial notice of the fact that space in many
county buildings is leased, and concessions are grhnted, to private indi-
viduals for the sale of "food, magazines, newspapers, public telephones and
other things which are mere incidents to the main or primary purpose
35. Id. at 211.
36. 66 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
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of the buildings, but are for the convenience of those who use the build-
ings or facilities for a public purpose.''"
The fact pattern of Gate City Garage, Inc. should be remembered
because a later supreme court case, State v. Clay County Development
Authority"8 announced that the facts of Gate City Garage and those of
Panama City v. State39 should form guidelines of the permissible per-
centage of private involvement in a public purpose project.
b. PANAMA CITY V. STATE
In Panama City v. State, the circuit court dismissed the petition of
the city to validate waterfront improvement revenue bonds. The proceeds
from the proposed bonds were to be used for the erection of two large
waterfront developments in Panama City. Two marinas were to be con-
structed, which were to have all necessary docks, docking facilities, water-
ways, parking and utilities required for the operation of a large marina.
At one of the marinas a concession building with shops to be leased to
private individuals was to be constructed. Of the total area of both
marinas, the concession buildings in question were to occupy only 1.22
percent of the total area. While obviously influenced by the small area
occupied by the concession buildings, the court focused on the necessity
of the concession buildings and the businesses "to ensure the success
of the main undertaking."" ° The court concluded that as the facilities
were a necessary adjunct to the successful operation of the main enter-
prise, the businesses were in that respect incidental to the operation of
the marina and not the principal purpose of the undertaking.
Panama City should be contrasted with City of West Palm Beach
v. State."' In City of West Palm Beach, the circuit judge declined to
validate a bond issue where the proceeds were to be used to finance con-
struction of a civic center with a marina and commercial shops. On ap-
peal, the supreme court affirmed and alluded to two fatal defects in the
issue which distinguished the case from Panama City. The first distin-
guishing point was that in City of West Palm Beach the entire civic
center was to be leased to the private corporation and the corporation was
to have the power to make all the rules and regulations affecting the use
of the civic center. The court pointed out that in Panama City the fact
that the city retained control of the project and leased only the various
37. Id. at 659. The court then cited with approval 18 Am. JUR. Eminent Domain, § 41
(1938), "The general rule is settled that the exercise of eminent domain for a public pur-
pose which is primary and paramount will not be defeated by the fact that incidentally a
private use or benefit will result which did not itself warrant the exercise of the power."
38. 140 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1962).
39. 93 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1957).
40. Id. at 614.
41. 113 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1959).
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units was the theory on which the court found that the bond issue did
not violate section 10. Moreover, the agreement with the private enter-
prise contained a provision, that in the event revenues from the lease
were insufficient to pay the principal and the interest on the bonds then
the monies derived from the utilities service tax in succeeding years
were to be pledged in support of the bonds. The court found that such
a provision not only violated section 10 of Article IX but also violated
the West Palm Beach City Charter which allowed revenue bonds for
the purposes of providing funds for projects, but required that the bonds
be retired exclusively from the revenues of the project and that the City
could not pledge utility franchise taxes for any deficits. The opinion
suggests in an indirect manner, that even though the legislature had
granted the City of West Palm Beach the authority to pledge franchise
utility taxes, such a pledge of credit would be violative of section 10 of
Article IX. The circuit court further found that the close proximity of
the marine project to a main shopping center in West Palm Beach,
would remove the requisite set forth in Panama City, that the shopping
facilities be necessary to the project.
C. STATE V. DAYTONA BEACH RACING & RECREATIONAL FACILITIES DIST.
In State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist.,42
the supreme court affirmed a validation of revenue bonds for racing and
recreational facilities as a valid public purpose even though a private
corporation was allowed to use the facilities during six months of the
year for scheduled motor racing. The appellant argued that to allow the
corporation to use the facilities during half of the year for forty years,
with no capital investment, constituted a loan of the District's credit.
The court responded that the undertaking was for a public purpose and
was not violative of section 10 even though some "private parties may
be incidentally benefited.1 4 While six months can hardly be considered
an incidental benefit, the true impact of the case is found in the court's
attempt to support the attraction for the purposes of tourism.
d. STATE V. INTER-AM. CENTER AUTHORITY
Combining both the lease-to-the-concessionaire aspect of Panama
City and the tourism aspect of Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational
Facilities Dist., is the case of State v. Inter-Am. Center Authority."' In
1951, the legislature created the Inter-American Center Authority as an
agency of the state.4" The Authority was authorized to construct, main-
tain, operate and provide for the establishment of an Inter-American
culture and trade center in or about the City of Miami. The culture and
42. 89 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1956).
43. Id. at 37.
44. 84 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1955).
45. FLA. STAT. ch. 554 (1963).
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trade center would provide means to display industrial, commercial,
agricultural and other products of the state. To advance this project,
the Authority was authorized to issue revenue bonds, but without pledg-
ing the credit of the state or any subdivision thereof. A proceeding was
brought to invalidate an issue by the Authority on the basis that the
Inter-American Culture and Trade Center was not a public purpose and
therefore violated section 10 of Article IX of the Constitution. The
court concluded that
Since the erection of a Trade Center is designed to strengthen
cultural relations among the countries of the Western Hemis-
phere, it cannot be said that it amounts to a pledge or loan
of the credit of the state to an individual, company, corporation
or association in violation of Section 10 of Article IX of the
Constitution."
Nor, stated the court, could any lease or rental to concessionaries, or
other leases, employed to accomplish the purposes of the central authority
be said to be a loan of the credit of the state.
E. Cotney-False Hope
Finally, in 1958, after a series of unrelated factual determinations
of what constituted an incidental benefit, the supreme court in State v.
Cotney,4 7 set forth what appeared to be a bold statement in favor of
projects that involved private enterprise in countywide development. The
Attorney General brought the original proceedings in quo quarranto to
attack the validity of chapter 57-1226, Special Acts of Florida 1957,
which authorized the Clay County Development Authority. The Authority
was granted the power to lease or purchase real property and to con-
struct improvements to be paid for by the proceeds of issued revenue
certificates. Permissible projects included those for the purpose of de-
velopment, expansion and promotion of industry, commerce, agriculture,
natural resources, vocational training and the construction of buildings
and plants for the purpose of selling, leasing or renting such structures
to private persons, firms or corporations. The Attorney General attacked
the Act as in violation of section 10 of Article IX. The court summarized:
We have no doubt that the Clay County Development Authority
was created to and will serve a valid public purpose in pro-
viding for the over-all development of Clay County. The setting
aside for industrial and commercial purposes of a portion of the
property already purchased is certainly a part of the balanced
over-all plan for the County's development; but there is nothing
in the record here to show that this was the primary purpose
for the acquisition of the federal government's surplus tract of
46. Supra note 44, at 1.2.
47. 104 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1958).
1966)
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
land, rather than an incidental part thereof. In these circum-
stances we find nothing in the previous decisions of this Court
construing § 10 of Article IX requiring us to hold that the
Authority's acquisition of property and disposed program for
its development amount to an appropriation of the Authority's
funds for, or the lending of its credit to, a private enter-
prise."'
Thus, it was clear that the supreme court had authorized this construc-
tion and lease of property to a private corporation since it was in concert
with the county's over-all development plan. Thus, suggested the court,
if the financial arrangement with private enterprise is only an incidental
part to the over-all development, then the revenue bonds of the develop-
mental authority will not be in violation of section 10.
The Cotney court's favorable attitude towards coupling private en-
terprise with an over-all county development program inspired the draft-
ing of similar development authorities by various counties which were
promptly adopted by the Legislature.49 It finally appeared that after
allowing incidental benefits on a small scale such as leases to shopholders,
the court had come full swing to allow the construction and leasing to,
private enterprise on a large development program.
F. A Retreat from Cotney-The Gate City Garage
and Panama City Test
Unfortunately, the Cotney decision was the last of the court's favor-
able attitude towards economic assistance to private enterprise. In the
cases that followed, the court returned to its prior position and allowed
limited economic assistance only when the facts were similar to those of
Gate City Garage and Panama City. This change in direction was sug-
gested by State v. Suwannee County Dev. Authority,0 and was con-
vincingly settled in the 1962 case of State v. Clay County Dev. Author-
ity.51 In Suwannee, the County Development Authority proposed a bond
issue that would be used to purchase real estate on which to construct
buildings to lease to private enterprise. The authorities argued that this
project was the first step in a much larger over-all development project.
The Authority insisted that the over-all project was for a valid public
purpose and the construction and lease to a private enterprise was merely
48. Id. at 349.
49. In the 1957 session, Baker County, ch. 57-1129; in the 1959 session, Gilchrist County,
ch. 59-1308; Hamilton County, ch. 59-1322; Jefferson County, ch. 59-1429; Lafayette
County, ch. 59-1460; Liberty County, ch. 59-1506; Madison County, ch. 59-1529; Okaloosa
County, ch. 59-1629; Suwannee County, ch. 59-1903; Taylor -County, ch. 59-1927; Union
County, ch. 59-1939; Walton County, ch. 59-1961; Washington County, ch. 59-1964; in the
1961 session, Bradford County, ch. 61-1894; Holmes County, ch. 61-2270; Jackson County,
ch. 61-2285; Lake County, ch. 61-2373; Putnam County, ch. 61-2727; Wakulla County, ch.
61-2982.
50. 122 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1960).
51. 140 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1962).
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incidental. The Authority relied on State v. Cotney.52 In reversing the
circuit court's decree validating the certificates, the supreme court re-
fused to accept the proposed future program of the Authority. The court
argued that the evidence showed that the Authority had not yet de-
vised any broad project and thus distinguished Cotney on the facts.
Justice Thornall, concurring specially, focused on the defect in the
Suwannee County Development Authority's proposed project.
I concur in the judgment of reversal for the reason that the
revenue bond resolution omits entirely a commitment of the
proceeds to any reasonable definite project within the limits
of appellee's statutory authority. Conceivably, a legitimate plan
could be developed. However, it is impossible to determine from
the resolution or the validating decree the nature of the project
which the appellee contemplates undertaking. The testimony
of the members of the appellee Authority is entirely speculative
as to how or for what purpose the revenue bond proceeds will
be used. Not a single member of the Authority appeared to have
any specific or reasonably definite ideas as to what would be
done with the money. It is possible that the money could be
applied to a public purpose under the resolution. However, the
entire proceedings are totally lacking in any showing that the
monies will be used for a purpose contemplated by the authoriz-
ing statute. 3
Justice Terrell, on the other hand, dissented on the basis that he was
convinced that the appellee had shown the proposed acquisition of land
and construction of a building to be leased to an industry was a very
small portion of the over-all county development program. Thus, it ap-
pears that Justice Terrell was convinced that an over-all program existed
while the majority was not. The Suwannee County Dev. Authority case
does not specifically recede from State v. Cotney,54 but reaffirms the
court's suspicion of economic assistance when there is the lack of a valid
well-defined over-all program that meets a public purpose. In this re-
gard, the two cases can be viewed together without internal conflict.
The death blow to State v. Cotney, was not to come until 1962 when
the supreme court heard the case of State v. Clay County Dev. Author-
ity.55 In Clay, the circuit court entered a decree validating certificates
that provided that the development authority would construct and equip
an industrial plant on portions of its previously acquired airfield and
would lease that plant to a private corporation for sixteen years with an
option to renew for ten additional years. It was agreed that the Authority
would finance the cost of buildings and equipping the plant by the issuance
52. 104 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1958).
53. Supra note 50, at 194.
54. Supra note 52.
55. Supra note 51.
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and sale by the Authority of revenue certificates that would be paid solely
from the sums to be paid by the company to the Authority over the initial
sixteen year term of the lease. The lease did allow the company an option
to renew for a period of ten years at an annual rate of 15,000 dollars per
year. It is interesting to note that the renewal clause in this case provided
for a substantial annual rental whereas the renewal clause in the case
of Town of North Miami provided for the payment of taxes that
amounted to only 1,000 dollars a year. In essence the court reviewed its
determination in State v. Cotney, and declared that the holding was meant
to be limited to projects that were "embraced within our holding in the
Gate City and Panama City cases." '56 Thus, for the majority, the size of
the project seemed to control. Naturally, the limited scope of the facts in
those two cases sounded the death knell of large-scale industrial develop-
ment bonding in Florida. For the development authorities were not
interested in aiding the small shop leaseholder, or the concession stand
owner, but rather were looking to entice large-scale industry to the area.
Justice Terrell and Justice Thornal dissented with compelling argu-
ments. Justice Terrell pointed out that in the financial arrangement, not
one cent from the public treasury of the Authority was pledged to support
the certificates and no lien on the property was imposed. The sole
security was limited to the rents derived from buildings proposed to be
constructed with the proceeds. He then argued that the case fell squarely
within the court's precedent that when the over-all purpose of the act to
be accomplished is a public purpose it will not be held invalid because of
an incidental private benefit. Justice Terrell was not moved to retreat to
the limited fact pattern of Gates City and Panama City. Justice Thornal
was even more vigorous in his dissent. He reminded the majority that in
Cotney, the court specifically held that the comprehensive over-all devel-
opment program now sought to be implemented was a recognized public
purpose to wit: The economic and cultural improvement and betterment
of Clay County and its municipalities. To justice Thornal, it appears
that the court was reversing its position in Cotney.
The Attorney General in State v. Cotney supra questioned this
very same statute (the statute creating the Clay County Devel-
opment Authority) in an obvious effort to eliminate doubts
regarding the Authority's powers. He contended that the Act
violated Section 10, Article IX, Florida Constitution, because it
authorized the acquisition and development of public property
for private purposes. This Court, in no uncertain terms, over-
ruled the point when it held the construction of improvements
on a part of the previously acquired land and the leasing thereof
to private concerns would be a mere incident to the overall pur-
pose which permeated the entire statute, to wit: The improve-
ment and development of Clay County. I feel that appellee au-
56. Id. at 579.
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thority was authorized to proceed in reliance on that decision.
It now appears to me that without expressly receding from the
clear holding in State v. Cotney, supra, we are reversing our
position. We are telling the authority that it has no power to ac-
complish that which, less than three years ago, we told them it
was their function to accomplish in the public interest.
57
Justice Thornal argued convincingly that the instant case was analo-
gous to the previously decided case of State v. Dade County, Florida,5"
in which the court authorized the Dade County Port Authority to raise
money to construct a large warehouse and overhaul shop on public land
for the immediate benefit of National Airlines. He reascned that there was
no distinction between the economic benefit brought to the City of Miami
by the additional airline facilities and the economic benefit sought to be
brought to Clay County by the adoption of this project. Justice Thornal's
thinking is sound.
G. The Favorite Sons
Justice Thornal's dissent in Clay focuses on the court's inconsistent
position in the application of the public purpose doctrine. This logical
inconsistency has the result of favoring some aspects of private enterprise
while penalizing others. The author submits that if the economic develop-
ment of a community is at issue, it is meaningless to promote air travel,
trade fairs, and auto racing while discouraging industrial enterprise. The
Clay court excluded these cases from the Gate City and Panama City
test and deemed the projects to be for a public purpose. Under close
scrutiny, however, the net result of these cases appears to be the improve-
ment of the public welfare, whether through additional recreational facili-
ties or improved transportation service and it is questioned whether the
court can determine categorically what projects are so connected with the
public welfare59 so as to be excluded from the application of Article IX,
section 10.
a. AIR TRAVEL
In State v. Dade County,60 the Circuit Court of Dade County vali-
dated a proposed issue of the Dade County Port Authority's special fund
certificates to construct a warehouse and overhaul shop to be leased to
National Airlines. National Airlines agreed to pay rent for the use of the
premises at an amount sufficient to pay both the principal and interest on
the revenue certificates as they matured. Without reference to section 10
of Article IX, the supreme court affirmed the circuit court's validation.
57. Id. at 585.
58. 62 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1953).
59. Contrast the cases of State v. Dade County, 62 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1953) and State v.
Okaloosa County Airport & Industrial Authority, 168 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1964) with the early
case of State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952) and the later Clay case,
140 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1962).
60. 62 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1953).
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Eleven years later, in State v. Okaloosa County Airport & Industrial
Authority,6' the court did apply section 10 to an industrial bond develop-
ment issue for the construction of certain buildings to be leased to a
private aircraft corporation. In Okaloosa, the Airport Industrial Authority
entered into a contract with Fairchild Stratos Corporation whereby the
Authority agreed to construct certain buildings and improvements upon
property owned by the Authority that would provide facilities for repair,
maintenance and care of aircraft using the Authority's airport. The im-
provements would be financed by certificates issued by the Authority.
These certificates were to be repaid solely from the rents paid by Fair-
child. The appellants argued that the proposed issue violated section 10,
Article IX of the Constitution and cited State v. Clay County Dev.
Authority.6 2 The court distinguished Clay on the facts and concluded:
The facilities proposed by the Authority in the case at bar
constitute an additional and direct benefit to the public by im-
proving service at the local airport, the adequate provisions of
which is the primary public purpose. Clearly, there is an inter-
dependence between the Authority's airport and the facilities
proposed for the repair, maintenance and care of the aircraft of
the flying public using said airport. For example, runways on the
public airport are not the only facilities essential to the func-
tional operation of an adequate airport. A number of other facil-
ities and aids are essential including those contemplated in the
project here. However, no clear interdependence between the
plastics factory and a recognized public purpose was found to
exist in the Clay County case.63
Thus, without reference to State v. Panama City,"4 the court adopted
the philosophy that a private benefit would be permissible when the
private enterprise's existence was a necessary "essential" to the opera-
tion of a larger public purpose.
b. RECREATION
The case of State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facili-
ties Dist.65 illustrates another favorite son-recreation. The supreme
court validated a bond issue to be used to construct and operate a racing
and recreational facility. These facilities were to be leased to a private
corporation for six months of the year so that the corporation could
conduct a series of motor racing events. Despite the extent of the private
industry's use of the facilities, the supreme court held that section 10 of
the constitution was not violated since the public purpose of the project
was paramount. Thus, the supreme court made the determination that
61. 168 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1964).
62. 140 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1962).
63. State v. Okaloosa County Airport & Industrial Authority, 168 So.2d 745-747 (Fla.
1964).
64. 93 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1957).
65. 89 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1956).
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recreational facilities are in the public welfare, and thus should be
protected.
The corporation would conduct automobile racing events of in-
ternational interest, as well as other attractions. Tourism, both
as between the areas of our state and as between the states of
this nation, is a competitive business. The sand and the sun and
the water are not sufficient to attract those seeking a vacation
and recreation. Entertainment must be offered. Even ignoring
its use by the District for periods aggregating one half of the
year, or more, for other recreational and educational purposes
for the public, the facility in question, considering the use to
which it will be adopted and their expected effect on the public
welfare, is definitely more a vital valid public purpose than
would be any of the schemes contemplated in the three instances
cited above."
The three instances referred to by the court were the development
for industrial purposes of an aluminum plant,6 7 the acquisition of an area
for lease to a private enterprise for industrial and commercial purposes,68
and a lease of fifty years from the City to a private enterprise for the
construction of a hotel.6 9 Thus, the court declared that the racing activity
was in the public welfare and definitely a more valid public purpose than
the industrial development sought to be achieved in the other instances.
But is the public welfare better served by a racing facility that will
entertain only a segment of the community? And, if the court is not
concerned with the economic aspects of the racing facility, why did it
include the statement that tourism is a competitive business and the sand
and the sun and the water are not sufficient without other forms of enter-
tainment to attract those seeking a vacation and recreation? No one can
doubt that tourism is in the economic welfare, but why is a plastics
manufacturing plant in Clay County or an aluminum plant in the Town
of North Miami not also in the economic public welfare? In both situa-
tions, private enterprise is being rewarded for its contribution to the
community. In Daytona Beach Racing, the private enterprise obtained
profits for six months of the year. Can this situation really be distin-
guished from a manufacturer's efforts to profit on a yearly basis? Can six
months of activity on the part of the Racing Corporation really be
defended as an incidental benefit?
C. TRADE FAIRS
Another apparent favorite of the court is seen in State v. Inter-,Am.
Center Authority.7" The supreme court affirmed a decree of the circuit
66. Id. at 37.
67. State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
68. Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1962).
69. City of Clearwater v. Caldwell, 75 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1954).
70. 84 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1955).
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court validating bonds issued by the Inter-American Culture & Trade
Center. The Center Authority adopted a resolution authorizing the
issuance of bonds and the execution of a trust indenture securing them,
which was included in the bond resolution. A provision of this trust
indenture came under attack as violative of section 10 of the constitu-
tion. The section in question provided that the Authority could lease,
exchange or trade any part of the land acquired by the Authority for pay-
ment or satisfaction of any bonds or other obligations of the Authority
and that the Authority may lease the property for residential, commercial
or industrial uses for a period of years. The court concluded that these
leases or rentals to concessionaires would not violate section 10 if they
sought to accomplish the purpose of the Center Authority, determined by
the court to be for a valid public purpose. The court found the public
purpose nature of the project in its design to "strengthen cultural rela-
tions among the countries of the western hemisphere," 7 ' and in the legis-
lature's declaration that "the creation of the Authority and the carrying
out of its purposes is i.i all respects to the benefit of the people of this
state and is a public purpose. ' 72 It is undeniable that the strengthening
of cultural relations among the countries of the western hemisphere will
be in the public welfare. Yet, it must be pointed out that those industries
leasing concessions will receive direct economic rewards for their partici-
pation in the project. The industrial displays are naturally to encourage
inter-American business which will bring a profit to the participating
companies. This economic growth will accrue to the benefit of the mem-
bers of the South Florida community. But why is this indirect economic
support of the South Florida community permissible under section 10 of
the consitution while a direct economic benefit to the community by an
industrial development bond project is not?
IV. PROPOSED JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND/OR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
It is difficult to precisely define the court's disfavor with an industrial
bond project supported entirely by the revenues of a rental relationship
with a private corporation. Two arguments, however, have occurred
throughout the cases. The principal fear is that a default in payment by
the private corporation will fall on the municipal corporation and ulti-
mately on the taxpayers. Secondly, the courts have expressed an unwill-
ingness to affect the free enterprise sense of competition by favoring a
particular industry in the area. Neither of these two arguments, however,
should prohibit the implementation of industrial bond projects in Florida.
As to the fear of the industries' default in payment under the lease,
it must be pointed out that the proposed bonds are not a general obliga-




tion of the municipal corporation, and that the bond holders are limited
by their contracts to the revenues of the project."3
The desire to refrain from interfering with private enterprise is an
appropriate argument where several like businesses are competing in an
area." However, this argument does not seem applicable where the new
industry is not competing with an established business. A lack of such
competition would generally be present in urban South Florida areas and
rural areas that are attempting to attract industry.
Despite these two arguments, it is evident that precedent is the main
motivating force behind the court's adherence to its adverse position on
industrial development bonds. To meet this precedent, the author submits
two alternative judicial constructions that will allow the use of the indus-
trial bonds in the State of Florida.
It must be recalled that the validation of a bond issue is a two-step
process. First it must be established that the project is for a public pur-
pose, and second, whether the bond is violative of section 10. Therefore,
the natural approach would be to broaden the concept of a project for a
public purpose. This approach would allow the court to take a long
range look at the economic welfare that would be obtained. If the courts
have been able to draw the distinction between a primary and incidental
private industry benefit, it should be up to the task of determining whether
a proposed lease construction agreement between the City and the private
enterprise would be in the public welfare. If the lease provided for a rent
that was reasonable for the facilities and would not constitute a windfall
to the private enterprise, then the court could consider the over-all econo-
mic benefit to the community. The court could also apply the competition
test to exclude projects that would discriminate against an established
manufacturer.
The second suggested vehicle of judicial construction which would
73. While the issuing agency is not directly liable under an industrial bond issue, some
writers have advanced two indirect harms to the issuing agency. First, if the issuing agency's
negligence or breach of trust occasions the default, the issuing agency may be liable. Second,
the record of the default would impair the issuing agency's borrowing power, and the public
would be forced to support this higher interest by an increase in taxes. Note, Incentives to
Industrial Relocation: Municipal Bond Plans, 66 HARV. L. REV. 898 (1953). However, these
arguments have been deemed unrealistic by another writer.
There are, at best, highly speculative arguments which ignore the fact that similar
consequences may attach to revenue bonds issued for any purpose, and which
grossly underestimate the skill of legal draftsmen, the cautious procedures of the
bond market and the sophistication of purchasers. Realistically, the modern bond
buyers who purchase industrial development bonds do not place their reliance on
the possibility of perfecting a tenuous negligence claim.
Note, Industrial Development Bonds: Judicial Construction, U.S. Plant Construction, 15
U. FLA. L. REV. 262, 277 (1962).
74. Thus, in City of West Palm Beach v. State, 113 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1959), the pro-
posed marina would compete with downtown shops.
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allow the use of industrial development bonds would be to sever the
public purpose test from a consideration of section 10. Thus, in evaluat-
ing a particular bond proposal, the court would focus on whether the
credit of the City was pledged. Therefore, if it were determined that the
credit of the municipal corporation was not pledged, the court would no
longer need to consider whether the over-all project was for a public
purpose. Or to put it another way, once something was found to be out-
side of section 10, the public purpose test would not apply. This approach
has been suggested in several of the supreme court opinions. Justice
Terrell, dissenting in State v. Clay County Dev. Authority,7 pointed out
that
not one cent from the public treasury of the Authority was
pledged to support the certificates in question; that no lien on
the property was imposed to support them, but that their sole
security was limited to rents derived from the building proposed
to be constructed from the proceeds of the certificates. The
public credit was in no sense bound to pay the principal or in-
terest on them .
7
In the earlier case of State v. City of Tallahassee,77 this approach was
taken by Justice Whitfield in a concurring opinion. The majority upheld
the bonding certificates because they were for a valid public purpose. The
purpose of the certificates was to construct an office building in which
space would be rented to federal, state and county governments.
Rather than focusing on the public purpose nature of the project, Justice
Whitfield stated that the certificates can legally be validated because the
certificates and the proceedings for issuing those certificates expressly
exclude the pledge of any tax or property resources of the City for the
payment of the certificates. These proposed judicial constructions would
alter the result in both State v. Town of North Miami,78 in the construc-
tion of an aluminum plant, and in State v. Clay County Dev. Authority
79
in the construction of the plastics plant. In both situations the rent was
calculated to fully amortize the principal and interest under the bond
issue. Thus the purchasers of the bonds would only look to the specific
revenue.
While there is ample authority for the courts to judicially construe
section 10 so as to authorize industrial development bonds, the general
tenor of the opinions would seem to necessitate legislative action in this
area. Aside from the momentary deviation of State v. Cotney, 0 the
supreme court's attitude has been that a project that is not primarily
75. 140 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1962).
76. Id. at 582.
77. 142 Fla. 476, 195 So. 402 (1940).
78. 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
79. Supra note 75.
80. 104 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1958).
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public in nature under the traditional definition of that word will not be
valid under section 10 of the constitution. Thus, a constitutional amend-
ment to section 10 to allow industrial development bonds would
seem the most probable avenue to allow for this method of industrial
development. A few states have passed such an amendment.8 ' Other states
have achieved the same results by statute. 2 In these instances the results
have been most favorable and should point the way for Flordia to follow
course. Naturally, a statute would not be appropriate due to the consti-
tutional provision of section 10; however, an addition to section 10
would suffice.
V. THE TENNESSEE STORY
The Tennessee legislature has provided three alternative methods of
attracting industry to Tennessee. Each of these bonding plans have
secured new industry and employment for the state. However, the
Tennessee Code sections authorizing the issuance of general obligation
bonds for industrial development is indeed a step further than the use of
industrial revenue bonds as urged by the author.
In 1951 the Tennessee legislature authorized municipalities and
counties to issue revenue bonds for the construction of facilities which
were to be leased to industry 3 "to encourage the increase of industry
and commerce within this state, thereby reducing the evils attendant
upon unemployment."8 " This act requires that the lease produce revenues
sufficient to pay the interest and principal on the bonds. These bonds are
not an indebtedness of the municipality and constitute a lien upon the
rentals from the industrial building. The Act further provides that a
three-fourths majority of the qualified voters who vote in the municipality
must approve the issue.85 This early attempt at industrial bond financing
produced from 1951, the year of its inception, to 1963, a total of 127
81. Louisiana, LA. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 14(b)(2); Missouri, Mo. CONST. amend. 4;
Maryland, MD. CONsT. art. III, § 54.
82. Alabama, ALA. CODE. ANN. tit. 37, §§ 511 (20 to 32) (1959) ; Arkansas, ARK. STAT.
ANN., §§ 13-1601-14 (Supp. 1961); Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANNir., §§ 36-20-1-10 (Supp.
1960); Georgia, GA. CODE, §§ 69-15; Idaho, Idaho Laws 1959 ch. 265 (declared uncon-
stitutional in Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353 P.2d 767
(1960)); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 1211-24 (Smith-Hurd 1960) ; Kentucky, Ky.
REV.. STAT., §§ 103.200 -.280 (1959); Maryland, MD. AcTs 1953 ch. 662, § 103; Mississippi,
MIss. CODE ANN., §§ 8936-46 (1957); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT., §§ 18-1601-13 (1954)
(declared unconstitutional in State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d
269 (1956), but subsequently the Nebraska voters amended the constitution to provide for
industrial bond issues, NEB. CO NST. art. XV, § 16 (approved Nov. 1960); New Mexico,
N.M. STAT. ANN., §§ 14-14-31-43 (Supp. 1954); North Dakota, N.D. REv. CODE, §§ 40-
5701-18 (Supp. 1957); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN., §§ 6-2901-16 (Supp. 1960); Vermont,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2701-14 (1959); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT., § 66.52 (1957).
8 . TENN. CODE ANr., § 6-1701 (1965).
84. TENN. CODE ANN., § '6-1703 (1965).
85. The 1951 Act was upheld as constitutional in Holly v. City of Elizabethton, 193
Tenn. 46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951).
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projects representing bond issues of 66,290,000 dollars with new employ-
ment of 20,795.88
Despite the success of the 1951 Act, the Tennessee legislature in
1955 added two chapters to the Tennessee Code to serve as new appeals
to industry. The attractiveness of the revenue bond issued under the
1951 Act was dimmed by the fact that the municipality's credit was
not pledged to support the issue. This limiting feature was removed, by
the passage of the Industrial Building Bond Act of 195587 which au-
thorized municipalities to issue general obligation bonds, the proceeds of
which were to be used to purchase or construct buildings for lease to
private industry. To issue bonds under this Act, the municipality must
first apply to the Building Finance Committee of the Tennessee Industrial
and Agricultural Development Commission for a "certificate of public
purpose and necessity."8 8 The Act enumerates certain factors that must
be found by the Commission before a certificate can be issued.8 9 The
issue must then be passed by a three-fourths majority of those voting
at a referendum election." From 1957 to 1965 general obligation bonds
totaling 25,274,000 dollars have been issued under this Act with a poten-
tial employment of 13,350. 9'
The 1955 Tennessee legislature also authorized the organization of
Industrial Development Corporations. 2 This Act provided for the incor-
poration within state municipalities of public corporations, chartered by
the Secretary of State
86. Figures compiled by the Staff Division for Industrial Development, Tennessee In-
dustrial Research Section, May 1964.
87. TENN. CODE ANN., §§ 6-2901-2916 (1965).
88. TENN. CODE ANN., § 6-2905 (1965).
89. (1) That there are sufficient natural resources readily and economically avail-
able for the use and operation of the particular industrial building and enterprise
for at least ten (10) years, but in no event less than the period of time for which
any bonds may be issued for acquiring or constructing said industrial building.
(2) That there is available a labor supply to furnish at least one and one-
half (1,) workers for each operative job in said enterprise within an area of
twenty-five (25) miles from the proposed location.
(3) That there are adequate property values and suitable financial conditions,
so that the total bonded indebtedness of the municipality, solely for the purposes
authorized by this chapter, shall not exceed ten per cent (10%) of the total assessed
valuation of all the property in the municipality ascertained by the last completed
assessment at the time of the issuance of such bonds. TENN. CODE ANN., § 6-2906
(1965).
90. The Industrial Building Bond Act of 1955 was declared constitutional in McCon-
nell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn. 498, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1955). However, the language of
the court does not appear to render the Act constitutional under all circumstances. In
Lebanon, the court found a virtual employment and migration crisis existed in the issuing
county and it may be argued that the court will limit the application of the Industrial
Building Bond Act of 1955 to situations of employment crisis. See Note, Financial Industrial
Development in the South, 14 VAND. L. REV. 621, 626-627 (1961).
91. Figures compiled by the Staff Division for Industrial Development, Tennessee Re-
search Section, Jan., 1966.
92. TENN. CODE ANN., §§ 6-2801-2820 (1965).
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to acquire, own, lease, and dispose of properties to the end that
such corporation may be able to promote industry and develope
trade by inducing manufacturing, industrial, governmental and
commercial enterprises to locate in or remain in this state and
further the use of its agricultural products and natural re-
sources, and to vest such corporation with all powers that may
be necessary to enable them to accomplish such purposes.93
One such power was the power to "issue its bonds for the purpose of
carrying out any of its powers. "s" However, all bonds issued by the
corporations were to be payable solely out of the revenues derived from
the lease or sale of the constructed facilities. 95 To make these bonds more
attractive, the Act allows the municipality where the corporation is
located to pledge its full faith and credit as surety to the payment of the
principal and interest by first obtaining a certificate9" of public purpose
from the Building Finance Committee of the Tennessee Industrial and
Agricultural Development Commission and second by approval by a
three-fourths vote of those voting in a referendum election.
The economic impact in the period from 1955 to 1965 under this Act
is also impressive: 60,753,500 dollars worth of bonds issued providing
10,876 potential jobs.97
In addition to Tennessee, the southern states of Kentucky and
Alabama also have impressive records of attracting new industry through
the use of industrial bond issues. In Kentucky,98 Municipal Industrial
Revenue Bonds, as they are known, have generated, in a period from
1950 until March 10, 1966, eighty-four industrial leases99 financed by
bonds totaling 130,308,000 dollars. 09 Alabama municipalities'' have
93. TENN. CODE ANN., § 6-2802 (1965).
94. TEN. CODE. ANN., § 6-2808(7) (1965).
95. TENN. CODE ANN., § 6-2809 (1965).
96. For the factors that govern the issuance of a certificate, see note 89 supra.
97. Figures compiled by the Staff Division for Industrial Development, Tennessee In-
dustrial Research Section, Feb., 1966.
08. Ky. REv. STAT. § 103.200 (1965).
99. Representative companies and their products include: General Shoe Corp. (shoes);
General Tire & Rubber Co. (tires); Hoover Ball & Bearing Co. (upholstery springs);
Great Lakes Carbon Corp. (perlite insulation); Rand McNally & Co. (book publishing);
The Crane Co. (plumbing fixtures) ; Electric Parts Corp. (electric bedcovering); Harvey
Aluminum (aluminum) ; Cutler-Hammer, Inc. (electrical controls) ; Crucible Steel Co.
(magnets); Levi Strauss & Co. (sta-prest trousers); Hobart Mfg. Co. (home dishwashers).
It should be noted that the industries involved are generally in the "light industry" classifi-
cation and would have been compatible with Florida's present economy had these com-
panies come to Florida.
100. Compiled from figures supplied by the Department of Commerce, Industrial De-
velopment Division, Commonwealth of Kentucky.
101. The Alabama Legislature authorized the issuance of Industrial Revenue Bonds,
ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 37, §§ 511(20)-(32) (1958) and the Alabama Supreme Court held that
the article did not violate §§ 45, 94, or 228 of the Alabama Constitution. Nor were the
bonds authorized by the article "indebtedness" within the meaning of § 225 of the Constitu-
tion; nor "bonds" within the meaning of § 222. Newberry v. Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57
So.2d 629 (1952).
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reported a partial listing of bonds issued through 1965 totaling over
283,662,000 dollars. 0 2
VI. A CAVEAT
While Tennessee courts have reacted favorably to the provisions of
the 1955 Acts that allow a state to pledge its credit to support a general
obligation bond issue, such a position can only be defended on economic
grounds rather than on sound principles of judicial construction that
permit revenue bonds on the theory that they are not pledges of the credit
of the municipality. Whereas revenue bonds are not the obligation of the
municipality and thus not a total affront to the public purpose doctrine,
the use of general obligation bonds to promote industry may be abusing
a good thing. In short, a caveat to the Florida Legislature and other state
legislatures is in order.
It must be remembered that the key to the entire concept of indus-
trial bond financing is the tax free interest on the bonds. Some writers
fear that the use of general obligation bonds to promote private industry
may lead Congress to reexamine the tax free nature of all industrial bond
issues. 3 Treasury Secretary Fowler already has proposed for congress
to end the tax exemption for industrial revenue bonds. 04 Such Congres-
sional action would be a devastating blow to industrial bond financing
and would undercut the action of those legislatures that have approved
such financing. Thus, over enthusiastic state legislatures may, if they do
not exercise restraint by authorizing only revenue bond financing, kill the
proverbial goose that is now providing new industry and jobs. For this
reason, the author recommends that any amendment to section 10 of
Article IX be expressly limited to revenue bonds supported solely from
lease proceeds.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many southern states have shown that a sympathetic attitude
towards the industrial development bond program will work to stimulate
the state's economy. Florida can no longer afford to avoid this competi-
tion for the location of new industry in the South. An amendment to
section 10 of Article IX of the Florida Constitution would be a step in
the right direction.
102. Compiled from figures supplied by the Alabama State Planning and Industrial
Development Board. Representative companies and the issuing municipality include: Ham-
mermill Paper Co. (Selma-25,000,000 in 1965); Revere Copper & Brass (Scottsboro-
55,000,000 in 1965) ; Union Bay-Camp Paper Corp. (Prattville-45,000,000 in 1964) ; Bendix-
Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co. (Cullman-3,000,000 in 1964); Vulcan Materials
(Bessemer-2,100,000 in 1964); Cornelius Co. (Scottsboro-,500,000 in 1963); General
Electronics of New Jersey (Sheffield-,200,000 in 1963) ; Cluett Penbody & Co. (Carbon
HiU-500,000 in 1963).
103. SuRREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 172-200 (1960); 50 CoLum. L.
REv. 618, 637 (1959).
104. Miami Review & Daily Record, July 14, 1966, p. 16, col. 4.
